This paper conducts a sensitivity analysis for operator error. The analysis is conducted with respect to the type of probability distribution used to describe error occurrence because the major dilemma when including operator performance in a study of transportation systems is choosing a probability distribution that accurately describes the occurrence of operator error. The motivation for the approach taken in this paper is that data is difficult and expensive to collect. It is worthwhile to determine how much and what kind of data needs to be collected. With this point of view, the paper begins with a simple distribution for error occurrence. The result from a simple distribution is compared to the results from more complicated distributions. All the distributions are based on a consideration of human factors and operating environments. The analysis is carried out for a sample transportation system, and there is an accident only if there is an error and certain traffic conditions. Because of this complexity, the safety parameter (the expected number of accidents during the systems' lifetime) is estimated by Monte Carlo methods.
Introduction
A number of transportation systems are planning upgrades to increase performance and safety. The new methods bring both new methods of operating and new failure modes [ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] . In all cases, a preliminary quantitative assessment is desirable. It can check that performance and safety requirements are met, compare different proposed architectures, and identify the important features and parameters.
error with the emphasis on the human factors that produce the error [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 141 . Some studies have examined the relation between the environment and human error [ 15,161, and one paper recommends studying human induced faults There have been numerous studies of human .
during maintenance to collect data on error occurrence [ 1 71. This paper, however, focuses on the effect of operator error irrespective of the cause. One possibility is that the causes of human error can be complex but its occurrence can be described by a simple model that is sufficient for the reliability analysis of a system.
To examine the possibility that a simple description of operator error is sufficient, the paper begins with a simple distribution and then compares these results to the results arising from more complicated distributions. All the distributions are based on a consideration of human factors and operating environments. Three different kinds of (probability distribution) dependencies are introduced.
(1) The rate of error occurrence can increase for a given period because of operator fatigue or working environment deterioration. At the end of the period, the rate is returned to its starting value by means of rest andor repair. (2) Different operators or working environments can have different error rates because of varying skill levels or varying layouts. (3) Operators can have performance cycles. Both positive and negative correlation are considered. For positive correlation, once an operator enters an error prone state, he tends to remain there. For negative correlation, an error acts as an alarm making an occurrence less likely in the near future.
As part of the sensitivity analysis, the examination uses an approach that could be called the method-of-extreme-distributions. Some of the distributions magnify the characteristic under study to an extreme (even unrealistic) degree. The purpose is to see if this characteristic has any influence on the occurrence of accidents.
The material below conducts a sensitivity analysis with respect to a safety parameter: the expected number of accidents during a system's lifetime. In this study there is an accident only if there is a failure and certain traffic conditions. Because of this complexity, the safety parameter (the expected number of accidents during the systems' lifetime) is estimated by Monte Carlo methods. This is a preliminary study, which means the emphasis is on methods. Conclusions are reached about the system examined, but these methods applied to a different system may yield different results.
History
full circle. The original intent was to apply aerospace technology to other fields. This was done successfully in rail transit for equipment models and simulation methods. The work, for railroads, was extended to an examination of operator error models. The question is whether or not the work on operator error can be adapted to aerospace.
This paper is an example of an idea coming
The Transportation System
The system is a canonical railroad example. There are two yards connected by a single track with a sidetrack midway. Movement is by fixed block protocol. The track layout is divided into disjoint sections called blocks, and there are gates (signalshwitches) at the end points of the blocks. Rules based on block occupancy allow trains to leave one block and enter another. There is an accident if two (or more) trains occupy the same block even if they are going in the same direction.
The diagrams for the track, gates, and blocks are given in Figures 1 and 2 . The yards at either end of the tracks are not indicated in the figures. The protocol for moving from lefl to right is letting blocks 2 and 3 be occupied by trains going the same direction. There is no check for trains entering the yards from blocks 1 and 4. It is currently assumed that a train can always safely enter a yard. This can be modified, but it requires information on yard traffic. It is possible that very little information is required, just the percentage of time that a train can safely enter the yard.
Additional assumptions for the simulation are:
If the train is at gate #3 it can proceed to gate
The current rule depends on the other rules not
The system lifetime is 25 years.
The yards are 60 miles apart, and the sidetrack at midway is 2 miles long.
The traffic consists of 60 trains per month equally divided between the two yards. For each yard the 30 trains arrive by uniform distribution (during the month) and proceed to the other yard according to protocol.
There is one type of train (a slow freight) that averages 30 miles per hour between any two points.
A gate can fail in a safe or unsafe manner. If it fails safe, all traffic is halted until repair (repair-on-demand). If it fails unsafe, it lets all traffic pass regardless of block occupancy.
An accident causes an investigation that identifies and repairs all failed gates.
There is monthly (periodic) maintenance that detects failed gates with a certain probability.
Both repair-on-demand and periodic maintenance occur quickly enough that there is no significant disruption of traffic.
If an operator fails (at a gate) his train enters the next block regardless of block occupancy.
Traffic disruptions from an accident dissipate before the next accident.
A train involved in an accident is not removed from the system. The accident is only multiple block occupancy, not necessarily a collision. This can lead to an overestimation for the expected number of accidents during the system's lifetime. (One method of checking on this possible overestimation is to perform the simulation removing any train involved in an accident. This has not been done.)
The system operates correctly if fault free or a gate fails safely. There are only two hazardous periods. One is between the unsafe failure of a gate and its detection. The other is between an operator error at a gate and his arrival at the next gate. There is an accident only if during these periods two or more trains occupy the same block.
The simulation considers the system one month at a time partly because of the monthly periodic maintenance and partly to create semideterministic traffic. There are a fixed number of trains per month with an equal number going in each direction, but their arrival time is subject to perturbations.
Dynamics of the Simulation
The heart of the simulation is an ordered (by time) list of events that occur during one month of operation. An event is either the arrival of a train at a gate or the (unsafe) failure of a gate. Each train or (unsafe) gate failure is stored as a vector. A train vector contains its identification as a train, its direction of travel, its arrival time at the next gate on its journey, and the operator error information for each of the gates. The original arrival time at gates #1 or #5 (the yard gates) give the time of the train's entry into the system. A failure vector contains its identification as a failure event, which gate fails, and the time of failure. 
Operator Errors-Models and Results
There are several sources for operator error. It can be internal from inattention or differing skill levels. It can be external from poor equipment layout or temporary system overload. The error distributions considered below can have either source. There is also the matter of complexity. An error occurrence can be the result of a complex sequence of incidents. These sequences, and the accompanying factor analyses, can be important when designing a workspace or operating procedure. This study, however, focuses on the global effect of an error occurrence, and it only needs the distribution of these occurrences.
The major question about operator error occurrence is what probability models are appropriate. Hence, this section considers a variety of distributions based on plausible assumptions about traffic systems and human behavior.
To begin, there are a number of ways to describe probability distributions--rates, densities, etc. This traffic scenario has discrete decision points (arrival at a signahwitch). Hence, a natural description is the probability of operator error at each decision point. The simplest description of operator error is the probability of error at a signal/switch. The question is whether or not more information than this is needed. Four different classes of distributions are examined. To connect these distributions, each will be given the same average.
A technique used below is that of extreme distributions where characteristics are greatly magnified. This is done as part of the sensitivity analysis to check if this characteristic has any significant influence on the occurrence of accidents.
operator will ignore a signal once in every two thousand arrivals. If a signal is green, there is no problem. If it is red, there is a possible accident.
This study assumes an average of 0.0005. An Constant Distribution probability for failure. In this case, failure is independent of past actions and global time. The probability of error is p = 0.0005 at all signalkwitches.
The simplest distribution is to have a constant
Increasing With Reset
Consider a distribution that increases during the year but is reset at the beginning of each year. Reasonable causes for this distribution are equipment deterioration with periodic restoration or overall workforce fatigue with a rest break. The intent is to study the effect of global time correlation. Three cases are examined. The first is a linear increase from 0 to 0.001 during the year. The second and third are extreme distributions to check if the type of distribution is significant. The second is 0 for the first six months and 0.001 for the second six months. The third is 0 for the first eleven months and 0.006 for the twelfth month. For simulating all three of these distributions, the probability of operator error was chosen according to the time of year.
Different Operator Values
vary in their ability and efficiency. We first suppose ability and efficiency is a sum of small factors. Hence the appropriate distribution is the normal. The mean is 0.0005. A standard deviation of 0.0002 was chosen to give maximum dispersion consistent with keeping most of the distribution positive. For this simulation, an error probability (chosen from the normal distribution) was assigned to each operator (or train) upon entering the system. The extreme distribution, for this case, is the binomial taking on only the values 0 and 1 for the probability of error. This corresponds to only one factor having significance (compared to a sum of numerous factors, which yields the normal). For the binomial, an operator obeys all signals with probability 0.9995 and ignores all signals with probability 0.0005. One of these traits (chosen according to the binomial values) was assigned to each train as it entered the system (arrived at one of the yards) Typically, people and operating environments
7.A.2-4
Performance Cycles-Correlatwn Models and both positive and negative correlation are examined. For positive correlation, once an operator or his equipment enters an error prone state they tend to remain there. For negative correlation, an error acts as an alarm and it less likely that there will be an error at the next signaVswitch. Both cases use the discrete Markov model in Figure 3 with the parameters chosen appropriately. When in state G, the good state, the operator ignores a signahwitch with probability p. When in state E, the error prone state, the operator ignores the signal with probability q. If q=p, there is no performance cycle, and this case is equivalent to the first model considered where there is just a probability p of ignoring a signayswitch. If q>p, there is positive correlation. Once in an error prone state, there is a tendency to remain there. If q<p, there is negative correlation. The occurrence of an error at a signahwitch makes it less likely that there will be an error at the next signayswitch.
This distribution considers performance cycles, n ( 1 -q ) Z E ' P Z G
(2)
We consider two positive correlation cases. First, if the operator is in the good state, then the chance of error is 1/10 the steady state probability of error. Solving equation (3) As each operator entered the system, he was assigned to one of the states in the model in Figure 3 according to the steady state probabilities. After that, his probability of error depending on the transitions he made through the model.
Results
size of 400 was used. The results are in Table 1 . It can be seen from the overlap of confidence intervals that the type of distribution is not significant. All of the 99% confidence intervals contain the expected value for the constant probability distribution: p = 1.47.
For each distributions, a Monte Carlo sample

Discussion
This section has investigated what information is needed about operator error in order to compute a safety parameter (the expected number of accidents during an operating period) for a given transportation system. The investigation begins by assuming the most elementary statistic is knownthe expected value of an operator error occurring. The question is whether or not more information is needed.
The first step is to compute the safety parameter assuming the most elementary distribution for the occurrence of operator error. The simplest distribution is that operator errors are independent events. There is no dependence upon global time, the individual operator, or an operator's performance cycle. The next step is to compute the safety parameter in the presence of these dependencies and compare the results. For this system, none of the dependencies make a significance difference. 
Description of Distribution
Summary
This paper conducts a sensitivity analysis for accidents arising from operator error. The system studied is a small railroad network but it contains a number of realistic features. In particular, the occurrence of an accident requires both a failure and suitable traffic conditions. The complexity requires a Monte Carlo estimation of the safety parameter which is the expected number of accidents during the system's twenty five year lifetime.
The major question for operator error occurrence is what probability distribution is appropriate. For this reason, a number of distributions are examined based on human characteristics such as fatigue, different ability levels, and performance cycles. For this system, it was discovered that the only significant parameter is the average probability of error. This is a desirable result in the sense that it simplifies the collection of field data.
The contribution of this paper is proposing that studies begin with simple distributions and then proceed to more complicated distributions to reveal what factors are significant and what factors are insignificant.
be called the method-of-extreme-distributions where some operator characteristics are greatly magnified. This is done as part of the sensitivity analysis to check if this characteristic has any significant influence on the occurrence of accidents.
A technique introduced in the analysis could
